

Foreign direct investment (FDI)—investment in enterprises from abroad that gives investors influence over the management of these enterprises—was the largest source of foreign capital in 2003, playing a significant role in shaping the global economy.¹ Yet flows of FDI to recipient countries fell 19 percent, to \$560 billion.² These “inflows” have been declining since a peak of \$1.47 trillion in 2000.³ Preliminary data for 2004 suggest that this decline has ended, however, with FDI inflows projected to increase to \$601 billion.⁴ (See Figure 1.)

Reduced inflows to industrial countries were responsible for the whole decline in 2003, with their FDI falling 27 percent to \$367 billion.⁵ (See Figure 2.) Inflows to low- and middle-income countries, on the other hand, increased marginally to \$193 billion.⁶ In 2004, this trend appears to have continued, with inflows to industrial countries falling to \$315 billion but those to low- and middle-income countries jumping to \$286 billion.⁷

In 2003, the United States was one of the hardest hit industrial countries, receiving 53 percent less in FDI than in 2002 (a total of \$30 billion) and less than a tenth of what it got in 2000.⁸ France became the largest industrial-country FDI recipient, at \$47 billion, although it too experienced a minor dip in inflows (6 percent).⁹

Of low- and middle-income countries, the biggest recipient was China, absorbing \$54 billion—on a par with the 2002 investments.¹⁰ (When comparing inflows to the size of the respective economy, however, China ranked thirty-seventh in the world.)¹¹ Hong Kong, Singapore, Mexico, and Brazil were the next largest, together receiving \$46 billion in 2003.¹² These five economies accounted for just over half of the inflows to low- and middle-income countries.¹³ All of Africa, in contrast, received just \$15 billion, though this did represent a 25-percent increase over 2002.¹⁴

The vast majority of FDI outflows originate from industrial countries. In 2003, 55 percent came from the European Union and 25 percent came from the United States.¹⁵ Low- and middle-income countries account for only 7 percent.¹⁶

At \$193 billion, FDI was the largest component of external capital flows in low- and middle-income countries in 2003.¹⁷ Official development assistance (ODA), at \$69 billion, also played a significant role, especially to many of the least developed countries, whose FDI inflows were relatively minor.¹⁸ Yet while total ODA has hovered at the current level for the past decade, FDI inflows have increased 43 percent.¹⁹

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are one of the largest sources of FDI.²⁰ In 2003, these accounted for \$297 billion, though the total value of cross-border M&As was down 20 percent, from \$370 billion in 2002.²¹

The sectors receiving FDI have changed over the years. While investment directed toward primary industries such as agriculture and mining declined from 9 percent of total FDI in 1990 to 6 percent in 2002, and that in manufacturing dropped from 42 to 34 percent, the share going to services jumped from 49 to 60 percent.²² In the primary sector, mineral and petroleum extraction accounted for the overwhelming majority of FDI inflows in 2001–02.²³ FDI inflows in the services sectors were more equally distributed, although finance and business services absorbed the largest shares.²⁴

The benefits and costs of FDI inflows continue to be mixed. FDI can stimulate economic growth.²⁵ It can also lead to technology transfers, which can help improve efficiency and reduce environmental impacts.²⁶ But if profits from these investments are not reinvested or if interest payments on intracompany loans (a source of FDI) are overly burdensome, the economic benefits can be limited.²⁷ Further, if investments divert production away from traditional sectors and toward goods and services that are polluting or that stimulate unhealthy or unsustainable lifestyles, then FDI can have overall negative impacts.²⁸

Whether a country benefits from FDI depends largely on the regulatory environment in the host country.²⁹ Without effective policies, for example, FDI can push local enterprises out of business or stimulate an inequitable distribution of services.³⁰

Figure 1. Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, 1970–2004





Figure 2. Inflows of FDI to Industrial and Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1970–2004



Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment, 1970–2004

Year	Total	Industrial Countries	Low- and Middle-Income Countries
(billion 2003 dollars)			
1970	50	37	14
1971	51	39	12
1972	53	40	13
1973	69	52	17
1974	79	66	13
1975	74	47	27
1976	56	41	15
1977	67	50	17
1978	80	59	21
1979	93	71	22
1980	108	91	17
1981	125	82	42
1982	100	54	46
1983	84	55	29
1984	95	65	29
1985	88	65	23
1986	130	104	26
1987	203	167	36
1988	231	187	44
1989	260	220	40
1990	271	222	49
1991	199	142	58
1992	204	131	73
1993	270	164	106
1994	306	171	135
1995	386	235	151
1996	439	251	188
1997	542	298	244
1998	759	519	240
1999	1,177	897	280
2000	1,471	1,174	297
2001	846	592	255
2002	691	499	192
2003	560	367	193
2004 (prel)	601	315	286

Source: UNCTAD.

- (Washington, DC: September 2004), p. 28; trade in goods from IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, online database, January 2005.
2. Worldwatch calculation from IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, op. cit. note 1.
 3. *Ibid.*
 4. IMF, op. cit. note 1; gross world product from Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003), p. 233, with updates from IMF, *World Economic Outlook Database* (Washington, DC: September 2004).
 5. World Trade Organization (WTO), "2004 Trade Growth to Exceed 2003 Despite Higher Oil Price," press release (Geneva: 25 October 2004).
 6. IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, op. cit. note 1; 2004 oil price from Centre for Energy, "Tetratechnologies, Inc. Announces 2005 Earnings Guidance and 2004 Fourth Quarter Earnings Estimate," The Woodlands, TX, 13 January 2005; price in 2003 from BP, *Statistical Review of World Energy 2004* (London: 2004), p. 14.
 7. International Energy Agency, *Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, May 2004), p. 2.
 8. World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects 2005* (Washington, DC: 2005), p. 8.
 9. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
 10. *Ibid.*
 11. World Bank, "Commodity Market Brief: Soybeans," online feature, at www.worldbank.org/global_outlook.
 12. *Ibid.*
 13. U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "Agriculture Commodity Prices Continue Long-term Decline," press release (Rome: 15 February 2005).
 14. WTO, "Day 5: Conference Ends Without Consensus," news brief (Cancun, Mexico: 14 September 2003).
 15. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, "Bridges—Cancun Special," No. 7 (Geneva: September-October 2003).
 16. International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, "Overview of the July Package," Doha Briefing Series, Vol. 3 (Geneva: December 2004).
 17. *Ibid.*
 18. FAO, op. cit. note 13.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS DECLINE (pages 48–49)

1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)," at www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3146&lang=1, viewed 05 January 2005; UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services* (Geneva: United Nations, 2004), p. 5.
2. UNCTAD, *FDI Database*, electronic database, updated September 2004.
3. *Ibid.* FDI inflows are the amount received by recipient (or host) countries while outflows are the amount invested by investor (or home) countries.
4. UNCTAD, "World FDI Flows Grew an Estimated 6% in 2004, Ending Downturn," press release (Geneva: 11 January 2005).
5. UNCTAD, op. cit. note 2.
6. *Ibid.* Low- and middle-income countries include all countries but those in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Japan, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand.
7. UNCTAD, op. cit. note 4.
8. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. 367.
9. *Ibid.* Luxembourg received the most FDI of industrial countries, but most of this is actually "transshipped" elsewhere (see UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, pp. xviii, 13).
10. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. 370.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 369–70. Hong Kong and Singapore, like Luxembourg, transfer a significant portion of FDI inflows to other countries (see UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. 18).
13. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, pp. 367–71.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 367.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 372.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 372, 375.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.
18. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), "Net ODA from DAC Countries from 1950 to 2003," *OECD Database*, updated December 2004; Americo Beviglia Zampetti and Torbjörn Fredriksson, "The Development Dimension of Investment Negotiations in the WTO," *The Journal of World Investment*, June 2003, pp. 399–450.
19. Official development assistance from OECD, op. cit.

- note 18; FDI from UNCTAD, op. cit. note 2.
20. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, pp. 5–6.
 21. UNCTAD, op. cit. note 2.
 22. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. 30.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
 24. *Ibid.*
 25. Rosalie Gardiner, “Foreign Direct Investment: A Lead Driver for Sustainable Development?” *Towards Earth Summit 2002* (London: UNED Forum-UK Committee, 2001), p. 3.
 26. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. xxiii.
 27. *Ibid.*; Gardiner, op. cit. note 25, p. 3.
 28. Gardiner, op. cit. note 25, p. 3.
 29. Zampetti and Fredriksson, op. cit. note 18.
 30. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2004*, op. cit. note 1, p. xxiii.
- Worldwatch Institute, *Vital Signs 2003* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p. 93.
14. Munich Re, op. cit. note 6.
 15. Wirtz, op. cit. note 1.
 16. Munich Re, op. cit. note 6.
 17. Wirtz, op. cit. note 2; Wirtz, op. cit. note 1.
 18. Wirtz, op. cit. note 1; Wirtz, op. cit. note 2.
 19. Wirtz, op. cit. note 2; Munich Re, op. cit. note 6.
 20. According to Essam El-Hinnawi of the Natural Resources and Environmental Institute in Cairo, cited in Rhoda Margesson, “Environmental Refugees,” in Worldwatch Institute, *State of the World 2005* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p. 40.
 21. Töpfer cited in Mark Townsend, “Environmental Refugees,” *The Ecologist*, June 2002.
 22. Bjarnason, op. cit. note 10.

STEEL SURGING (pages 52–53)

WEATHER-RELATED DISASTERS NEAR A RECORD (pages 50–51)

1. Angelika Wirtz, Munich Reinsurance Company (Munich Re), e-mail to Janet Sawin, 15 February 2005.
2. Angelika Wirtz, Munich Re, e-mail to Janet Sawin, 28 January 2003; Wirtz, op. cit. note 1.
3. Wirtz, op. cit. note 1; Wirtz, op. cit. note 2.
4. Wirtz, op. cit. note 2; Wirtz, op. cit. note 1.
5. AFP, “Missing Expected to Take Tsunami Toll past 280,000,” *ABC News Online*, 25 January 2005.
6. Munich Re, “The Ten Largest Natural Catastrophes in 2004,” at www.munichre.com, viewed 20 January 2005.
7. Concern Worldwide, “Nearly 75% of Bangladesh Underwater; Concern Warning of Increasing Humanitarian Crisis,” press release (New York: 27 July 2004).
8. Munich Re, op. cit. note 6.
9. Lester R. Brown, *Eco-Economy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 169; Doug Reken-thaler, “China Floods Exacerbated by Man’s Impact on Land, Climate,” *Disaster Relief*, 8 October 2004.
10. Dan Bjarnason, “Deforestation in Haiti,” *CBC News Online*, 1 October 2004.
11. Wirtz, op. cit. note 2.
12. U.N. Environment Programme, *Environmental Emergencies Newsletter* (Nairobi), September 2004.
13. Janet Sawin, “Severe Weather Events on the Rise,” in International Iron and Steel Institute (IISI), “The Largest Steel Producing Countries, 2004,” at www.worldsteel.org, viewed 2 February 2005.
14. IISI, *Steel Statistical Yearbook 2004* (Brussels: 2005), pp. 10–11.
15. *Ibid.*
16. IISI, “World Produces 1.05 Billion Tonnes of Steel in 2004,” press release (Brussels: 19 January 2005).
17. IISI, op. cit. note 2, p. 12.
18. IISI, op. cit. note 1.
19. Asia’s share from IISI, op. cit. note 2, p. 12; 48 percent calculated from IISI, op. cit. note 4.
20. IISI, op. cit. note 2, p. 83.
21. Global Insight, Inc., “World Outlook for Key Drivers of Demand for Iron and Steel,” fact sheet, at www.globalinsight.com, viewed 5 February 2005.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Michael Fenton, “Iron and Steel Scrap,” *Mineral Commodity Summaries* (Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, January 2005), pp. 88–89.
24. IISI, op. cit. note 2, pp. 39–41.
25. Fenton, op. cit. note 11, pp. 88–89.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. “International Iron and Steel Institute Shares Short-Range Outlook,” *American Recycler*, June 2004.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Ian Porter, “Nissan to Put Japanese Production on Hold,” *The Age*, 29 November 2004.
31. Christopher Davis, “Rise in Global Steel Demand